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Abstract
We study sealed-bid auctions with …nancial externalities, i.e., auctions
in which losers’ utilities depend on how much the winner pays. In the
unique symmetric equilibrium of the …rst-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB),
larger …nancial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected
revenue. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid
auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous e¤ects. We further show that a resale
market does not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB
yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB. With a reserve price, we …nd
an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price. For
SPSB we derive a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of a
weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium.




In this paper, we study sealed-bid auctions with …nancial externalities. Finan-
cial externalities arise when losers bene…t directly or indirectly from a high price
paid by the winner(s). In auction theory, it is generally assumed that losers are
indi¤erent about how much the winner(s) pay(s) in an auction. However, in
real life auctions, this assumption may be false. In reality, an auction is not an
isolated game, as winners and losers also interact after the auction. Paying a
high price in the auction may make a winner a weaker competitor later.
¤For valuable discussions and comments we like to thank Eric van Damme and Jacob
Goeree, and seminar participants at Tilburg University and the 2001 Econometric Society
European Meeting.
ySEOR, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, +31-
10-408-1513, fax +31-10-408-9220, emaasland@few.eur.nl. The main part of this work was
conducted while Maasland was a¢liated with CentER, Tilburg University.
zCPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM
Den Haag, The Netherlands, +31-70-338-6116, fax +31-70-338-3350, A.M.Onderstal@cpb.nl,
http://www.cpb.nl/eng/general/org/homepages/amo/. Onderstal’s work was supported by
NWO grant 510 010 501. The main part of this work was conducted while Onderstal was
a¢liated with CentER, Tilburg University.
1The series of UMTS auctions that took place in Europe o¤ers a concrete
example of auctions where losers bene…t indirectly from a high price paid by the
winners. In this context, there are at least three ways how …rms that do not
acquire a license may bene…t from a winning …rm paying a high price. First,
the share values of winning …rms may drop, which makes the winner vulnerable
to a hostile take-over by competing …rms. For instance, the drop of the share
value of the Dutch telecom company KPN with about 95% is partly explained
by the huge amount of money the company spent to acquire British, Dutch
and German UMTS licences.1;2 Second, if …rms are budget constrained, a high
payment in the …rst auction may give competing …rms an advantage in the
later auctions. Third, high payments may force the winning …rms to cut their
budget for investment, which may be favorable for the losers’ position in the
telecommunications market, as the losing …rms are not only competitors of the
winning …rms in the auction, but in the telecommunications market as well.
Börgers and Dustmann (2001) argue that …nancial externalities may have led
to seemingly irrational bidding in the British UMTS auction.
Financial externalities occur directly when losing bidders get money from
the winner(s). For instance, this may happen in the case of bidding rings, in
which a member of the ring receives money when she does not win the object
(McAfee and McMillan, 1992). Also, partnerships are dissolved using an auction
in which losing partners obtain part of the winner’s bid (Cramton et al., 1987).
Finally, the owner of a large estate may specify in his last will that after his
death, the estate is sold to one of the heirs in an auction, where the auction
revenue is divided among the losers (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994).3
In Section 2, we present a model of bidding in sealed-bid auctions with …nan-
cial externalities. The …rst-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB) or the second-price
sealed-bid auction (SPSB) is used to sell an indivisible object. We assume an
independent private signals model, with private values and common value mod-
els as special cases. Financial externalities are exogenously given and modelled
by a parameter ' that is inserted in the bidders’ utility functions. This is the
simplest extension of the independent private signals model which incorporates
…nancial externalities. Despite its admitted simplicity, this model appears to be
su¢ciently rich to generate interesting insights.
In Section 3, we derive results for FPSB and SPSB without reserve price.
We …nd a unique symmetric and e¢cient bid equilibrium for each of the two
auction types. Equilibrium bids in FPSB decrease as ' increases. An intuition
for this result is that larger …nancial externalities make losing more attractive for
the bidders so that they submit lower bids. The e¤ect of …nancial externalities
on the equilibrium bids in SPSB is ambiguous. A possible explanation is that
in SPSB, a bidder is not only inclined to bid less the higher is ' (as she gets
positive utility from losing), she also has an incentive to bid higher, because,
given that she loses, she is able to in‡uence directly the level of payments made
1In the UK, KPN bought part of the TIW license after the auction. In Germany, KPN
has a majority share in E-plus.
2The other part of the drop is probably explained by the changed sentiment in the market.
3More examples can be found in Goeree and Turner, 2001.
2by the winner. We also study the e¤ect of a resale market. Haile (1999) shows
in an independent private values model that the e¢cient equilibria of FPSB
and SPSB remain una¤ected when the auction is followed by a resale market.
We show that this result still holds in our model, and that it extends to any
auction which leads to an e¢cient assignment of the object. Finally, we give a
revenue comparison between FPSB and SPSB. We …nd that in the two-bidder
case, SPSB results in a higher expected revenue than FPSB.
In Section 4, we characterize equilibrium bid strategies for the case that a
reserve price is imposed in FPSB and SPSB. For simplicity, we assume indepen-
dent private values and two bidders. In this section, we introduce the concept
of a weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is an equilibrium in
which all types below a threshold type abstain from bidding, and all types above
this type submit a bid according to a strictly increasing bid function. We …nd
that FPSB has no weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, we
derive an equilibrium in which bidders with low signals abstain from bidding,
bidders with intermediate signals pool at the reserve price, and bidders with high
signals submit a bid according to a strictly increasing bid function. For SPSB,
we derive a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of a weakly sep-
arating Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For low values of the reserve price, such an
equilibrium exists, for high values it does not. If a weakly separating Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists, then all types above the threshold type submit the
same bid as in the case of no reserve price.
A closely related paper is Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), who considers an
auction game in which each bidder receives an equal share ® of the revenue. He
characterizes equilibrium bid functions for both FPSB and SPSB, and gives a
revenue comparison between these two auction types.4 It is straightforwardly
checked that his model is isomorphic to our model. Therefore, the equilib-
rium bids in our model can directly be derived from the equilibrium bids in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994). However, the comparative statics in our model
and Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ model (the e¤ect of ' respectively ® on the equilib-
rium bids and the seller’s revenue) turn out to be di¤erent. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
shows that the equilibrium bid functions of FPSB and SPSB are increasing in
®. In our model, the e¤ect of ' on the equilibrium bids can be both increasing
and decreasing: We add to Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ analysis that, if attention is
restricted to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria, these equilibrium bid func-
tions are unique. Also, in addition to Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ study, we analyze
the e¤ect of a resale market, and of a reserve price on the equilibrium bids.
There are several other papers related to ours. Our companion paper (Maasland
4Several other papers make use of Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ model. Ettinger (2000) extends
the model by allowing the revenue shares to di¤er among the bidders and by introducing
reserve prices. Engers and McManus (2000) study charity auctions, in which bidders receive
a warm glow from the auction revenue, so that their utility depends on the auction revenue.
Goeree and Turner (2002) compare standard auctions with k-th price all-pay auctions in
Engelbrecht-Wiggans’ environment. Simultaneously and independently of us, Engers and
McManus, and Goeree and Turner derive similar results as Engelbrecht-Wiggans and we with
respect to equilibrium bidding in FPSB and SPSB, and the revenue comparison among these
two auction types.
3and Onderstal, 2002) focuses on optimal auction design in the context of …nan-
cial externalities. In that paper, we show that in a Double Coasean World, in
which the seller cannot prevent a perfect resale market, nor withhold the object,
the lowest-price all-pay auction is optimal.5 Moreover, in a Myersonean World,
in which the seller can both prevent resale after the auction and fully commit to
not selling the object, we …nd a two-stage mechanism that is revenue maximiz-
ing. In the …rst stage of this mechanism, bidders are asked whether they accept
to pay an entry fee. If and only if all choose to accept, then in the second stage,
bidders play the lowest-price all-pay auction with a reserve price.
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996, 2000), and Jehiel et al. (1996, 1999) study auc-
tions in which losing bidders receive positive or negative allocative externalities
from the winner. Since the utility of the bidders is a¤ected by the identity of the
winner and not by how much she pays, these externalities are clearly di¤erent
from …nancial externalities. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) derive equilibrium bid
strategies that involve some pooling at the reserve price for SPSB with a reserve
price and positive externalities. This equilibrium structure is similar to the one
we found in FPSB.
Benoît and Krishna (2001) study a two-bidder model with complete infor-
mation in which two objects are sold sequentially. As bidders are budget con-
strained, a particular bidder’s payo¤ is a¤ected by the price paid by a rival
bidder, so that their model can be interpreted as a model with endogenously
determined …nancial externalities.
2 The model
We consider a situation with n ¸ 2 risk neutral bidders, numbered 1;2;:::;n,
who bid for one indivisible object. The auction being used is either FPSB or
SPSB. Each of these auction types may or may not have a reserve price.
Essentially, we use Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) model with independent
signals instead of a¢liated signals as a starting point. We assume that each
bidder i receives a one-dimensional private signal ti which is drawn, indepen-
dently from all the other signals, from a cumulative distribution function F.
(We also say that bidder i is of type ti.) F has support on an interval [t;¹ t], and
continuous density f with f(ti) > 0 for every ti 2 [t;¹ t].
We will let vi(t) denote the value of the object for bidder i given the vector
t ´ (t1;:::;tn) of all signals. Special cases are private value models (vi(t) only
depends on ti), and common value models (vi(t) = vj(t) for all i;j;t).
We make the following assumptions on the functions vi.
Value Di¤erentiability: vi is di¤erentiable in all its arguments, for all i;t:
Value Monotonicity: vi(t) ¸ 0;
@vi(t)
@ti > 0; and
@vi(t)
@tj ¸ 0, for all i;j;t:
5In this auction, the bidder that submits the highest bid wins the object, and every bidder
pays the lowest submitted bid.
4Symmetry: Fi = Fj for all i;j; and vi(:::;ti;:::;tj;:::) = vj(:::;tj;:::;ti;:::) for
all ti;tj;i;j:
Value Di¤erentiability is imposed to make the calculations on the equilibria
tractable. Value Monotonicity indicates that all bidders are serious, and that
bidders’ values are strictly increasing in their own signal, and weakly in the
signals of the others. Symmetry may be crucial for the existence of e¢cient
equilibria in standard auctions.6 Value Di¤erentiability, Value Monotonicity,
and Symmetry together ensure that the bidder with the highest signal is also
the bidder with the highest value, so that these assumptions imply that the
seller assigns the object e¢ciently if and only if the bidder with the highest
signal gets it.
We de…ne F[1] and f[1] as the cumulative distribution function and density
function respectively of maxj6=i tj. Also, let us de…ne v(x;y) as the expected
value that bidder i assigns to the object, given that her signal is x, and that the
highest signal of all the other bidders is equal to y:
v(x;y) ´ Efvi(t)jti = x;max
j6=i
tj = yg:
By Symmetry, F[1], f[1], and v do not depend on i.
The bidders are expected utility maximizers. Each bidder is risk neutral,
and cares about what other bidders pay in the auction. More speci…cally, the
utility function of bidder i is de…ned as follows:
ui(j;b) =
½
vi ¡ b if j = i
'b if j 6= i,
where vi is the value that i attaches to the object, j is the winner of the object
and b is the payment by j. It is a natural assumption to let a bidder’s interest
in her own payments be larger than her interest in the payments by the other
bidders, so that we assume ' · 1=(n ¡ 1).
A speci…c interpretation of the model is a situation of an auction in which all
losing bidders receive an equal share of the auction revenue. In particular, when
' = 1=(n ¡ 1), the entire auction revenue is divided among all losing bidders,
which may be the case in situations of dissolving partnerships, or heirs bidding
for a family estate. If n = 2 and ' = 1, then FPSB and SPSB are special cases
of the k-double auction with k = 0 and k = 1 respectively.7;8
6Bulow et al. (1999) show that a slight asymmetry in value functions may have dramatic
e¤ects on bidding behavior in the English auction in a common value setting, as the bidder with
the lower value function faces a strong winner’s curse, and therefore bids zero in equilibrium.
7The k-double auction has the following rules. Both bidders submit a bid. The highest
bidder wins the object, and pays the loser an amount equal to kbL + (1 ¡ k)bW, where bL is
the loser’s bid, bW the winner’s bid, and k 2 [0;1].
8Cramton et al. (1987) study k-double auctions in a private values environment with
symmetric value distributions. It is shown that partners with equal shares may dissolve a
partnership e¢ciently using these auctions. McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that the 0-
double auction is a mechanism that allows a bidding ring to allocate the obtained object
53 Zero reserve price
Consider FPSB and SPSB with a zero reserve price.
3.1 First-price sealed-bid auction
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium bid function for FPSB.
To derive equilibrium bidding, we suppose that in equilibrium, all bidders use the
same bid function. By a standard argument, this bid function must be strictly
increasing and continuous. Let U(t;s) be the utility for a bidder with signal t
who behaves as if having signal s, whereas the other bidders play according to




at s = t. From this condition, a di¤erential equation can be derived, from
which the equilibrium bid function is uniquely determined (at least if we restrict
our attention to di¤erentiable bid functions). The auction outcome is e¢cient.
Observe that in the case of private values (v(x;y) only depends on x), the bid
function is strictly increasing in n.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric di¤erentiable Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of FPSB is characterized by















where B1(';t) is the bid of a bidder with signal t. The outcome of this auction
is e¢cient.
Proof. A higher type of a bidder cannot submit a lower bid than a lower
type of the same bidder. (If the low type gets the same expected surplus from
strategies with two di¤erent probabilities of being the winner of the object, the
high type strictly prefers the strategy with the highest probability of winning,
so the high type will not submit a lower bid than the low type.) Also, B1(';t)
cannot be constant on an interval [t0;t00]. (By bidding slightly higher, a type t00
can largely improve its probability of winning, while only marginally in‡uencing
the payments by her and the other bidders.) Moreover, B1(';t) cannot be
discontinuous at any t. (Suppose that B1(';t) makes a jump from b to b at t¤.
A type just above t¤ has an incentive to deviate from b + ± to b. Doing so, she
is able to decrease the auction price, while just slightly a¤ecting its probability
of winning the object. As ' is small enough, this type is able to improve its
e¢ciently among the ring members. Van Damme (1992) shows that k-double auctions may
lead to unfair equilibrium outcomes. Angeles de Frutos (2000) and Kittsteiner (2001) gen-
eralize the model of Cramton et al. (1987) allowing for asymmetric value distributions and
interdependent valuations respectively.
6utility.) Hence, a symmetric equilibrium bid function must be strictly increasing
and continuous.
De…ne the utility U(t;s) for a bidder with signal t who misrepresents herself
as having signal s, whereas the other bidders report truthfully, if the bid function








The …rst two terms of the RHS of this expression refer to the case that this
bidder wins the object. The third term refers to the case that she does not win.
Assume that B1(';s) is di¤erentiable in s. Maximizing U(t;s) with respect to
s and equating s to t gives the FOC of the equilibrium
f[1](t)v(t;t) ¡ f[1](t)B1(';t) ¡ F[1](t)B0
1(';t) ¡ 'B1(';t)f[1](t) = 0.
With some manipulation we get

























is ful…lled. Using integration by parts, (3) can be rewritten as (1).
From (2), we infer that
@B1(';t)
@t > 0 if and only if B1(';t) <
v(t;t)
1+' , so that
indeed B1(';t) is strictly increasing in t; as Value Monotonicity implies that
dv(y;y)
dy > 0 for all y. Finally, by Value Di¤erentiability, Value Monotonicity,
and Symmetry, the e¢ciency of the auction outcome is established.
Each of the terms of the RHS of (1) has an attractive interpretation. The …rst
term is the equilibrium bid for a bidder with type t in SPSB without …nancial
externalities, as in the absence of …nancial externalities, in SPSB, a bidder will
submit a bid equal to her maximal willingness to pay given that her strongest
opponent has the same signal as she (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). The second
7term can be interpreted as the bid shading because of …nancial externalities.
The reason for bid shading is that in the case of …nancial externalities, the
willingness to pay of a bidder with type t bidding against an opponent who has
the same signal is given by 1
1+'v(t;t). This can be seen as follows. When a
bidder wins at a bid of b, her utility is v(t;t)¡b. When her opponent wins at the
same bid, her utility is 'b. Equating these utilities results in a bid of 1
1+'v(t;t).
The third term can be interpreted as the strategic bid shading because in FPSB,
a bidder has to pay her own bid rather than the second highest bid which she
has to pay in SPSB.
This interpretation of the equilibrium bid function suggests that this function
is decreasing in ', which in fact holds, as Proposition 2 shows. From Proposition
2, it immediately follows that the expected revenue is decreasing in '.
Proposition 2 Increasing ' decreases B1(';t):
Proof. The proof immediately follows from Proposition 1, since F[1](y) <
F[1](t) for every y 2 [t;t).
Corollary 3 Increasing ' decreases the seller’s expected revenue.
3.2 Second-price sealed-bid auction
Equilibrium bids for SPSB are obtained using the same logic as for FPSB. The
analysis reveals, just as in situations without …nancial externalities, uniqueness
and e¢ciency of the equilibrium bid function. Observe that in the case of private
values, the bid function does not depend on n.9
Proposition 4 The unique symmetric di¤erentiable Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of SPSB is characterized by

















where B2(';t) is the bid of a bidder with signal t. The outcome of this auction
is e¢cient.
Proof. Following the lines of the proof of Proposition 1 it can be established
that a symmetric equilibrium function must be strictly increasing and continu-
ous. The utility for a bidder with signal t acting as if she had signal s is given
9This is actually a quite subtle observation, as n does not appear in the expression for the









where ¼(s) denotes the probability that there is exactly one opponent with a
signal larger than s. The …rst term of the RHS refers to the case that this bidder
wins, the second term to the case that she submits the second highest bid, and
the third case to her bid being the third or higher. Assume that B2(';s) is
di¤erentiable in s. The FOC of the equilibrium is
[v(t;t) ¡ B2(';t)]f[1](t) + '
@¼(t)B2(';t)
@t
¡ 'B2(';t)¼0(t) = 0
or, equivalently
v(t;t)f[1](t) = B0
2(';t)'¼(t) + B2(';t)[(1 + ')f[1](t)]: (5)
The general solution to the above di¤erential equation is equal to
B2(';t)(1 ¡ F(t))
1+'













The only possible di¤erentiable bid function that may constitute a symmetric


















holds. Using integration by parts on B2(';t), we see that (6) can also be written
as (4).
To complete the proof, we must show that B2(';t) is indeed increasing in t.















9As (5) implies that B0
2(';t) > 0 if and only if B2(';t) >
v(t;t)
1+' , B2(';t) is indeed
strictly increasing in t. Then, by Value Di¤erentiability, Value Monotonicity,
and Symmetry, it follows that the outcome of the auction is e¢cient.
Each term of the RHS of (4) has its attractive interpretation. From the
discussion of FPSB it follows that the …rst term is the bid in SPSB in the
absence of …nancial externalities. The second term is the bid shading due to
positive externalities from the payment of the winning bidder. The third term
increases the bid due to the fact that each bidder is willing to drive up the …nal
price, as it is the second highest bid that is paid by the winner.
In contrast to FPSB, the e¤ect of an increase in ' on the equilibrium bids in
SPSB is dependent on a bidder’s type. From (4), it is clear that the equilibrium
bid of the highest type is decreasing in '. The reason is that as this bidder
does not have a type above her, she does not have an incentive to drive up the
price. However, the e¤ect of ' on the equilibrium bids of the other types is not
clear. The e¤ect of the second term of the RHS of (4) (without the minus sign)
may be larger as well as smaller than the third term. The following example
illustrates how equilibrium bidding is a¤ected when ' is varied.
Example 5 (E¤ect of ' on equilibrium bidding) Let F(t) = t (uniform
distribution), v(t;t) = t (independent private values) for all t 2 [0;1]: The
equilibrium bid function is given by
B2(';t) =
'




t, t 2 [0;1].
As B2 is a continuous function in both ' and t, the following can be derived.
First, there is a strictly positive mass of types close to zero for which the e¤ect
of ' is ambiguous in the sense that for ' close to 0, an increase in ' leads
to higher bids and for ' close to 1, an increase in ' leads to lower bids. This
follows from the following observations.
@B2(0;0)
@'








Intuitively, if ' is large enough, B2(';t) decreases as for each bidder, losing
becomes more interesting due to higher …nancial externalities. Second, the equi-
librium bids of types close to 1 are decreasing in '. This follows from the fact
that B2(';1) = 1
1+'.
Also, the e¤ect of ' on the expected revenue may be ambiguous. This follows
from Example 6, in which the expected revenue is increasing if ' is small, and
decreasing if ' is large.
10Example 6 (E¤ect of ' on the expected revenue) Let F(t) = t (uniform
distribution), v(t;t) = t (independent private values) with t 2 [0;1] and n = 2
(two bidders): The expected revenue is equal to the expectation of B2(';t(2))
with respect to the second highest signal t(2), which is given by
Et(2)fB2(';t(2))g =
1 + 4'
3(1 + ')(1 + 2')
:
This continuous function is increasing for ' close to 0 and decreasing for '















The presence of a resale market does not have any e¤ect on equilibrium behavior.
In order to obtain this result, the following assumptions are made. First, trade
is voluntary. None of the bidders can be forced to be involved in an exchange if
she is made worse o¤ by it. Thus, trade only takes place if it is mutual pro…table
for the bidders. Second, the participants in the resale market are the same as
in the auction. There are no third parties involved.
We assume the following conditions for trade to occur in the resale market.
Let bidder i be the winner of the object in the auction, and bidder j be another
bidder, who desires to buy the object from bidder i in the resale market. Let ~ p
be the price of the object in the resale market. As trade is voluntary, none of
the bidders may be worse o¤ by the trade. For bidder i, the following condition
for trade must be ful…lled:
~ p + '~ p ¸ vi: (7)
In words, bidder i prefers receiving a price of ~ p, which also yields her a …nancial
externality of '~ p, to keeping the object, which gives her a value of vi. For bidder
j a similar condition holds:
vj ¡ ~ p ¡ '~ p ¸ 0; (8)
which is equivalent to
~ p + '~ p · vj: (9)
Note that, 'e p in (8) is a correction factor. This can be seen as follows. Without
trade, the utility of bidder j is 'p, where p is the price paid by bidder i in
11the auction. With trade in the resale market, bidder i has paid p ¡ e p. This
would give bidder j a utility increase of '(p ¡ e p) due to …nancial externalities.
Therefore, bidder j loses an extra 'e p, if she decides to buy the object in the
resale market. Observe that, (7) and (9) exclude ine¢cient trade (trade from a
bidder with a high value to one with a low value). Moreover, for both bidders
the maximal gains from trade are vj ¡ vi.
Proposition 7 shows that equilibrium bidding is not a¤ected by the presence
of a resale market if the equilibrium of the auction without resale market leads
to an e¢cient outcome. We prove this proposition by assuming that all bidders,
apart from bidder i, bid “as usual”, i.e., they bid in the auction as if there
were no resale market. Then we calculate bidder i’s utility both for the case
when she submits a lower bid than “usual”, and for the case that she submits
a higher bid. In both cases, we separately calculate bidder i’s utility from the
auction, and the maximal utility she can obtain in the resale market, which is
the di¤erence between her value, and the highest value among the other bidders.
Adding these, we show that bidder i has no incentive to deviate from bidding
“as usual”.
Proposition 7 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of an auction (without resale
market) which leads to an e¢cient assignment of the object, is also a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium when the same auction is followed by a resale market where the
same bidders participate. In equilibrium, no trade will take place in the resale
market.
Proof. To prove that “bidding as usual” is still an equilibrium, suppose
that all bidders, apart from bidder i, bid as usual. Then it should be a best
response for bidder i to bid as usual as well. Let U(t;s) be the expected surplus
for bidder i from the auction plus the resale market, when she has signal t, but
behaves as if she has type s.
Suppose for the moment that all bidders play the e¢cient Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the auction game without resale market. Then, by Value Dif-
ferentiability, Value Monotonicity, and Symmetry, the bidder with the highest
signal wins the auction. Moreover, by the assumption of voluntary trade (which
exclude ine¢cient trade), no trade will take place after the auction. From the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem,10 U(t;t) is given by








When we change the order of integration and integrate the inner integral we get
U(t;t) = U(t;t) +
t Z
t
[v(t;y) ¡ v(y;y)]dF[1](y): (10)
10See Maasland and Onderstal (2002) for this result in the context of …nancial externalities.
12The utility e U(t;s) from the auction alone for bidder i who has type t, but
represents herself as if she has type s is given by
e U(t;s) = e U(s;s) +
t Z
t
[v(t;y) ¡ v(s;y)]dF[1](y). (11)
Suppose that bidder i misrepresents herself as having a signal s > t. Trade will
only take place when bidder i wins the auction, and there is another bidder j
who has a higher valuation for the object. The gains from trade for bidder i
from the resale market are at most the absolute di¤erence between her value and
the value of bidder j, which is, by Value Di¤erentiability, Value Monotonicity,
and Symmetry, the bidder with the highest signal. Let y be bidder j’s signal,
then bidder j’s value is at most v(y;y). Bidder i’s value is given by v(t;y).
Then, with (10) and (11),
U(t;s) ¡ U(t;t) · e U(s;s) +
s Z
t




















So, bidder i cannot gain from deviating to a higher signal.
13Suppose instead that bidder i deviates to a lower signal. Then, similarly,
U(t;s) ¡ U(t;t) · e U(s;s) +
s Z
t




















Hence a deviation to a lower type is not pro…table. So, indeed it is a best
response for bidder i to bid as usual.
As the equilibrium of the auction is e¢cient, it is always the bidder with the
highest value who obtains the object after the auction. As ine¢cient trade is
excluded in the resale market, no trade will take place there.
A corollary of the above result is that the equilibrium bids in FPSB and
SPSB do not change when resale market opportunities are introduced. This
immediately follows from the fact that both auctions have e¢cient equilibria,
as was shown in Propositions 1 and 4. Moreover, no trade will take place in the
resale market.
3.4 Revenue comparison for n = 2
For the tractable case of two bidders, if 0 < ' < 1, SPSB generates a strictly
higher expected revenue than FPSB.11 This revenue ranking result is obtained
by proving that the utility of the lowest type is strictly higher for FPSB than
for SPSB. This short-cut immediately follows from the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem (Myerson, 1981) which remains valid in case …nancial externalities
are introduced (Maasland and Onderstal, 2002). According to the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem, two auctions which are both e¢cient, and yield zero
utility for the lowest type, yield the same expected revenue. For ' = 1, both
auctions are revenue equivalent, which follows as the utility of the lowest type
is the same for both auctions.
To obtain the proof of Proposition 9, the following lemma appears to be
useful.
11Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) claims the same result for n bidders, but his proof is not
correct, even not for the case of two bidders.



























Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 9 For ' < 1 and n = 2, SPSB generates a strictly higher expected
revenue than FPSB. For ' = 1 and n = 2, FPSB and SPSB are revenue
equivalent.
Proof. Let U1(t) and U2(t) be the equilibrium utility of the lowest type
in FPSB and SPSB respectively. As the outcome of both auctions is e¢cient,
a bidder with type t loses the auction with probability 1, and gets …nancial


























































































When we apply Lemma 8 with y = F(t) to the di¤erence between U1(t) and
U2(t), we …nd for ' 2 (0;1) that the utility of the lowest type is strictly higher
for FPSB than for SPSB. For ' = 1, by Lemma 8, U1(t) ¡ U2(t) = 0.
4 Positive reserve price
Consider FPSB and SPSB with a reserve price R > 0. In order to keep the model
tractable, we assume that the standard independent private values model holds,
i.e., vi(t) = ti for all i, t. Also, we restrict our attention to the case of two
bidders.
This section mainly focuses on the existence of weakly separating Bayesian
Nash equilibria, for which the following de…nition applies.
De…nition 10 A weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in which all types below a threshold type abstain from bidding,
and all types above this type submit a bid according to a strictly increasing bid
function.
4.1 First-price sealed-bid auction
In contrast to a situation without …nancial externalities, there exists no weakly
separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium for FPSB. Proposition 11 shows that, if
such an equilibrium would exist, R must be the threshold type. The equilibrium
bid function can be constructed analogous to the equilibrium bid function for
FPSB without reserve price. But then a contradiction is established, as a bidder
with type R turns out to submit a bid below the reserve price.
16Proposition 11 Let vi(t) = ti for all i, t, and n = 2. There exists no weakly
separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium of FPSB if R > 0.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose for the moment that a weakly
separating equilibrium does exist. Then it is easily derived that all bidders with
a type below R abstain from bidding, and all types above R submit a bid
according to a strictly increasing bid function, which we denote by h. Using
similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be established that
h0(t) ¸ 0 if and only if h(t) · t
1+'. Hence, for t = R, it holds that h(R) · R
1+'.
In other words, in a weakly separating equilibrium, a bidder with type R submits
a bid strictly below R. This contradicts the fact that all submitted bids should
exceed the reserve price R.
However, there is a symmetric equilibrium that involves pooling at the re-
serve price. Proposition 12 describes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which
bidders with a type below a threshold type L do not bid, bidders with a type t
above a threshold type H bid gR(t), where gR is a strictly increasing function,
and types in the interval [L;H] submit a bid equal to R. More speci…cally, let
H = (1 + ')R;
L the unique solution to
'[F(H) ¡ F(L))]R
F(H) + F(L)





F[1](y)'f[1](y)ydy + F[1]((1 + ')R)1+'R.
This is an equilibrium, as L turns out to be indi¤erent between abstaining from
bidding, and submitting a bid equal to the reserve price, and H turns out to be
indi¤erent between bidding R (and therefore pool with all types in the interval
[L;H]), and bidding marginally higher than R, and gR is derived from the same
di¤erential equation as the bid function for FPSB without reserve price.
Proposition 12 Assume independent private values and two bidders. Let BR
1 (';t),






gR(t) if t > H
R if L · t · H
\no bid" if t < L.
Then BR
1 (';t) constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of FPSB
if R > 0.12
12Note that BR
1 (';t) is continuous at H: This must be the case in equilibrium. Suppose,
on the contrary, that the bid function has a jump at H. Then a bidder with a type slightly
higher than H has an incentive to deviate from the bid strategy to a bid of just above R.
17Proof. Assume that threshold types L and H exist such that in equilibrium
all types t < L abstain from bidding, all types t 2 [L;H] bid R, and all types
t > H bid according to a strictly increasing bid function gR.
A type L is indi¤erent between not bidding and bidding R. The utility of




gR(t)dF(t) + 'R[F(H) ¡ F(L)]:




gR(t)dF(t) + bd [F(H) ¡ F(L)]f'R + (L ¡ R)g + F(L)(L ¡ R).
Equating both expressions yields
'[F(H) ¡ F(L)]R
F(H) + F(L)
= L ¡ R: (12)
L is uniquely determined from (12) as the LHS of (12) is strictly decreasing in
L and the RHS of (12) is strictly increasing in L for L ¸ 0:
A type H is indi¤erent between bidding R and bidding an in…nitesimal ±




gR(t)dF(t) + bd [F(H) ¡ F(L)]f'R + (H ¡ R)g + F(L)(H ¡ R):




gR(t)dF(t) + [F(H) ¡ F(L)](H ¡ R) + F(L)(H ¡ R):
Equating both expressions, and some manipulation yields
H = (1 + ')R.
In order to complete the proof, we need to check whether types have no incentive
to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. We only check if a type t > H has
no incentive to mimic another type t0 > H, as by a standard argument, other
deviations are not pro…table. Incentive compatibility of types t > H implies that
gR should follow from the same di¤erential equation as derived in the proof of
Proposition 1 with the boundary condition gR(H) = R. Analogous to the proof
18of Proposition 1, it can be established that gR(t) is strictly increasing for t ¸ H
if and only if gR(t) < t

























To get an intuition why pooling at R occurs in equilibrium, consider a sit-
uation in which R ¸
¹ t
1+'. The threshold level H, above which bidders bid
according to a strictly increasing bid function, lies above ¹ t, so that bidders ei-
ther abstain from bidding, or bid R. Why is this an equilibrium? Suppose that
one of the two bidders submits a bid b ¸ R. Then the other bidder prefers
losing to winning. This can be seen as follows. If she loses, then her utility is







whereas winning gives her a utility of at most










Low types are then willing to lose the opportunity of getting the object by
abstaining from bidding. High types bid R, assuring themselves the object if
the other bidder does not bid, but also making sure that if the other bids, to
lose as often as possible.
4.2 Second-price sealed-bid auction
In contrast to FPSB, SPSB sometimes has a (weakly) separating Bayesian Nash
equilibrium when a reserve price is imposed. This observation follows trivially
when the reserve price is smaller than the lowest submitted equilibrium bid,
which is strictly positive according to Proposition 4. However, also in nontrivial
cases weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibria exist. Proposition 13 gives
a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of a weakly separating
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If the equilibrium exists, types up to a threshold
type b t abstain from bidding, and types above b t submit the same bid as in the
case of no reserve price.
19Proposition 13 Assume independent private values and two bidders. Let R 2
[B2(';t);B2(';t)]. SPSB with a reserve price R has a weakly separating Bayesian





B2(';t) if t ¸ b t
“no bid” if t < b t
where BR
2 (';t) is the bid of a bidder with value t, and where b t is the unique
solution to
'(B2(';b t) ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(b t)) = F(b t)[R ¡b t].
Proof. Suppose there is an R for which a weakly separating equilibrium




B2(';t) if t ¸ b t
\no bid" if t < b t
is an equilibrium, where B2 is the equilibrium bid function in the case of R = 0. b t
is indi¤erent between submitting no bid, and submitting a bid equal to B2(';b t).
Hence, b t follows from the following equation
(1 ¡ F(b t))'R = F(b t)(b t ¡ R) + (1 ¡ F(b t))'B2(';b t),
which is equivalent to
'R =
F(b t)
(1 ¡ F(b t))
(b t ¡ R) + 'B2(';b t). (13)
For t ¸ b t, BR
2 (';t) follows from the same di¤erential equation as derived in the
proof of Proposition 4 with the same boundary condition BR
2 (';t) = t
1+', so
that indeed BR
2 (';t) = B2(';t) for all R and t ¸ b t.
A weakly separating equilibrium exists if and only if B2(';b t) ¸ R, as all
bids should be above R. We will show now that B2(';b t) ¸ R is equivalent to
the condition B2(';R) ¸ R, which completes the proof.
De…ne e t such that
B2(';e t) = R: (14)





(t ¡ R) + 'B2(';t)
for all t. Note that h is a strictly increasing function, with
h(b t) = 'R,
20(which follows from (13)), and
h(e t) =
F(e t)
1 ¡ F(e t)
(e t ¡ R) + 'R. (15)
Now, with (14), as B2 is strictly increasing,
B2(';R) ¸ R () B2(';e t) = R · B2(';R) () e t · R:
Moreover, with (15), as h is strictly increasing,
e t · R () h(e t) · 'R = h(b t) () e t · b t:
Finally, as B2 is strictly increasing, and from (14),
e t · b t () B2(';b t) ¸ R:
An intuition for the condition B2(';R) ¸ R being necessary is the following.
In a weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a bidder with type R is
always prepared to submit a bid of at least R. To see this, observe that for
this bidder, in a weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a bid equal to R
yields the same revenue as abstaining from bidding. However, in equilibrium,
each type that submits a bid, does so according to the equilibrium bid function
for the situation with no reserve price. This implies that if B2(';R) < R, a
bidder with type R would submit a bid below the reserve price, which is not
possible, so that a contradiction is established.
The intuition for the condition being su¢cient is as follows. In a weakly
separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each bidder who submits a bid, submits
a bid as if there were no reserve price. Then, for the existence of a weakly sepa-
rating equilibrium, it remains to be checked that B2(';b t) ¸ R. If B2(';R) ¸ R,
then there is a type e t · R for which B2(';e t) = R. As a reserve price does not
a¤ect equilibrium bidding of types that submit a bid, it follows that if type e t
would submit a bid in equilibrium, she would submit a bid equal to R. How-
ever, type R is indi¤erent between bidding R and not submitting a bid, so
that e t prefers not to submit a bid. Therefore, b t must exceed e t, so that indeed
B2(';b t) ¸ B2(';e t) = R.
The necessary and su¢cient condition B2(';R) ¸ R implies that for small
R a weakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists, but not for large R.
As said, the existence of such an equilibrium is trivial in the case of small R.
However, for R close to ¹ t, B2(';R) < R, as, by Proposition 4, B2(';¹ t) < ¹ t.
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied auctions in which losing bidders obtain …nancial externalities
from the winning bidder. We have derived bidding equilibria for FPSB and
21SPSB, and have established that the presence of a resale market does not a¤ect
equilibrium behavior. Also, we have shown that in the two-bidder case SPSB
dominates FPSB in terms of expected auction revenue if ' < 1 and that both
auctions are revenue equivalent if ' = 1. Moreover, we have studied equilib-
rium bidding for FPSB and SPSB when a reserve price is imposed. We have
observed pooling at the reserve price for FPSB. For SPSB, we found a necessary
and su¢cient condition for the existence of a weakly separating Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
An interesting possibility for future research is to investigate what the e¤ects
are of asymmetric …nancial externalities in a private values environment. For
instance, one may examine what happens in case only one of the bidders imposes
a …nancial externality on the other bidders. Bulow et al. (1999) consider a
situation in which two bidders bid for a common value object, and one of the
bidders receives a fraction of the auction revenue. The bidder without toehold
in the auction revenue faces a strong winner’s curse, and therefore bids zero in
equilibrium, even if the toehold of the other bidder in the auction revenue is
in…nitesimally small. Although the authors restrict their attention to a common
value environment, their analysis shows that asymmetric …nancial externalities
may have dramatic e¤ects on the auction revenue.
Motivated by the observation that in SPSB, low signal bidders increase their
bids when ' is increased (for ' not too large), also a model with asymmetries in
the valuation function may be fruitful to study. One may imagine that with one
bidder with a low value, and one bidder with a high value, the price in SPSB
may be higher with …nancial externalities than without …nancial externalities,
as the bidder with the low value has an incentive to push up the price when '
is strictly positive.
6 Appendix








The …rst and second order derivatives of Ã are respectively given by
Ã
0(y) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ y)
1


















00(1) = ¡' < 0.
Hence, if y is close to 0, Ã(y) must be below zero and concave, and similarly
for y close to 1, Ã(y) is negative and concave. Suppose now that, in contrast
22to what is stated in the lemma, Ã(y) > 0 for some y 2 (0;1). As Ã and all its
derivatives are continuous functions on the interval (0;1), Ã
00(y) must change
sign at least four times, or, equivalently, Ã
00(y) = 0 for at least four values of y
in (0;1). De…ne ¹ ´ 1
', º ´ ' ¡ 1, and » ´ 1
' ¡ 1. Note that
»
º < 0. Then,
Ã




















The last expression has at most two solutions in the interval [0;1], as the left
hand side is strictly convex in y, and the right hand side is a linear function in
y. A contradiction is established, so the …rst part of the lemma must be true.
The second part is trivial. ¥
7 References
Angeles de Frutos, M. (2000). “Asymmetric Price-Bene…ts Auctions,” Games
Econom. Behavior 33, 48-71.
Benoît, J-P., and Krishna, V. (2001). “Multiple-Object Auctions with Bud-
get Constrained Bidders,” Rev. Econ. Stud., 68, 155-179.
Börgers, T., and Dustmann, C. (2001). “Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour
in the United Kingdom’s Third Generation Spectrum Auction,” working paper,
University College London.
Bulow, J., Huang, M., and Klemperer, P. (1999). “Toeholds and Takeovers,”
J. Polit. Econ. 107, 427-454.
Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., and Klemperer, P. (1987). “Dissolving a Part-
nership E¢ciently,” Econometrica 55, 615-632.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1994). “Auctions with Price-Proportional Bene-
…ts to Bidders,” Games Econom. Behavior 6, 339-46.
Engers, M., and McManus, B. (2000). “Charity Auctions,” working paper,
University of Virginia.
Ettinger, D. (2000). “Auctions and Toeholds,” working paper, CERAS.
Goeree, J. K., and Turner, J. L. (2001). “All-Pay-All Auctions,” working
paper, University of Virginia.
Goeree, J. K., and Turner, J. L. (2002). “How (Not) to Raise Money,”
working paper, University of Virginia.
Haile, P. A. (1999). “Auctions with Resale,” working paper, University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
Jehiel, P., and Moldovanu, B. (1996). “Strategic Nonparticipation,” RAND
J. Econ. 27, 84-98.
Jehiel, P., and Moldovanu, B. (2000). “Auctions with Downstream Interac-
tion Among Buyers,” RAND J. Econ. 31, 768-791.
23Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., and Stacchetti, E. (1996). “How (Not) to Sell
Nuclear Weapons,” Ame. Econ. Rev. 86, 814-29.
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., and Stacchetti, E. (1999). “Multidimensional
Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities,” J. Econ. Theory 85, 258-
83.
Kittsteiner, T. (2001). “Dissolving a Partnership with Double Auctions in a
Model with Interdependent Valuations,” working paper, Mannheim University.
Maasland, E., and Onderstal, S. (2002). “Optimal Auctions with Financial
Externalities,” working paper, Tilburg University.
McAfee, R. P., and McMillan, J. (1992). “Bidding Rings.” Ame. Econ.
Rev. 82, 579-599.
Milgrom, P. R., and Weber, R. J. (1982). “A Theory of Auctions and Com-
petitive Bidding,” Econometrica 50, 1089-1122.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design,” Math. Oper. Res. 6,
58-73.
Van Damme, E. (1992). “Fair Division under Asymmetric Information,” in
R. Selten (ed.), Rational Interaction - Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi,
Springer, Berlin - Heidelberg, 121-144.
24 
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 
Our working papers are available on the Internet at the following addresses: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
                       http://papers.ssrn.com 




SUST 1.2002  K. TANO, M.D. FAMINOW, M. KAMUANGA and B. SWALLOW: Using Conjoint Analysis to Estimate Farmers’ 
Preferences for Cattle Traits in West Africa 
ETA 2.2002  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Paolo SURICO: What Does Monetary Policy Reveal about Central Bank’s 
Preferences? 
WAT 3.2002  Duncan KNOWLER and Edward BARBIER: The Economics of a “Mixed Blessing” Effect: A Case Study of the 
Black Sea  
CLIM 4.2002  Andreas LöSCHEL: Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A Survey 
VOL 5.2002  Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Stable Coalitions 
CLIM 6.2002  Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Rockets and Feathers Revisited: An International 
Comparison on European Gasoline Markets 
ETA 7.2002  Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Eftichios S. SARTZETAKIS: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An 
Analytical Approach 
KNOW 8.2002  Alain DESDOIGTS: Neoclassical Convergence Versus Technological Catch-up: A Contribution for Reaching a 
Consensus 
NRM 9.2002  Giuseppe DI VITA: Renewable Resources and Waste Recycling 
KNOW 10.2002  Giorgio BRUNELLO:  Is Training More Frequent when Wage Compression is Higher? Evidence from 11 
European Countries 
ETA 11.2002  Mordecai KURZ, Hehui JIN and Maurizio MOTOLESE: Endogenous Fluctuations and the Role of Monetary 
Policy 
KNOW 12.2002  Reyer GERLAGH and Marjan W. HOFKES: Escaping Lock-in: The Scope for a Transition towards Sustainable 
Growth? 
NRM 13.2002  Michele MORETTO and Paolo ROSATO: The Use of Common Property Resources: A Dynamic Model 
CLIM 14.2002  Philippe QUIRION: Macroeconomic Effects of an Energy Saving Policy in the Public Sector 
CLIM 15.2002  Roberto ROSON: Dynamic and Distributional Effects of Environmental Revenue Recycling Schemes: 
Simulations with a General Equilibrium Model of the Italian Economy 
CLIM 16.2002  Francesco RICCI (l): Environmental Policy Growth when Inputs are Differentiated in Pollution Intensity 















20.2002  Guillaume HAERINGER (liv): On the Stability of Cooperation Structures 
NRM 21.2002  Fausto CAVALLARO and Luigi CIRAOLO: Economic and Environmental Sustainability: A Dynamic Approach 
in Insular Systems 
CLIM 22.2002  Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO, Igor CERSOSIMO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Back to Kyoto? US 
Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation 
CLIM 23.2002  Andreas LÖSCHEL and ZhongXIANG ZHANG: The Economic and Environmental Implications of the US 
Repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Subsequent Deals in Bonn and Marrakech 
ETA 24.2002  Marzio GALEOTTI, Louis J. MACCINI and Fabio SCHIANTARELLI: Inventories, Employment and Hours 
CLIM 25.2002  Hannes EGLI: Are Cross-Country Studies of the Environmental Kuznets Curve Misleading? New Evidence from 
Time Series Data for Germany 
ETA 26.2002  Adam B. JAFFE, Richard G. NEWELL and Robert N. STAVINS: Environmental Policy and Technological 
Change 
SUST 27.2002  Joseph C. COOPER and Giovanni SIGNORELLO: Farmer Premiums for the Voluntary Adoption of 
Conservation Plans 
SUST 28.2002  The ANSEA Network: Towards An Analytical Strategic Environmental Assessment  
KNOW 29.2002  Paolo SURICO: Geographic Concentration and Increasing Returns: a Survey of Evidence 
ETA 30.2002    Robert N. STAVINS: Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies NRM 31.2002  Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Multi-Criteria Analysis and Decision-Support for Water Management at 
the Catchment Scale: An Application to Diffuse Pollution Control in the Venice Lagoon 
NRM 32.2002  Robert N. STAVINS: National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years 
KNOW 33.2002  A. SOUBEYRAN and H. STAHN : Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good 
Industries? 
KNOW 34.2002  G. BRUNELLO, M.L. PARISI and Daniela SONEDDA: Labor Taxes, Wage Setting and the Relative Wage 
Effect 
CLIM 35.2002  C. BOEMARE and P. QUIRION (lv): Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: Lessons from 
Economic Theory and International Experiences 
CLIM 36.2002  T.TIETENBERG (lv): The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned? 
    CLIM   37.2002  K. REHDANZ and R.J.S. TOL (lv): On National and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits 
    CLIM   38.2002  C. FISCHER (lv): Multinational Taxation and International Emissions Trading 
    SUST   39.2002  G. SIGNORELLO and G. PAPPALARDO: Farm Animal Biodiversity Conservation Activities in Europe under 
the Framework of Agenda 2000 
    NRM   40.2002  S .M. CAVANAGH, W. M. HANEMANN and R. N. STAVINS: Muffled Price Signals: Household Water Demand 
under Increasing-Block Prices 
    NRM   41.2002  A. J.  PLANTINGA, R. N. LUBOWSKI and R. N. STAVINS: The Effects of Potential Land Development on 
Agricultural Land Prices 
    CLIM   42.2002  C. OHL (lvi): Inducing Environmental Co-operation by the Design of Emission Permits 
    CLIM   43.2002  J. EYCKMANS, D. VAN REGEMORTER and V. VAN STEENBERGHE (lvi): Is Kyoto Fatally Flawed? An 
Analysis with MacGEM 
    CLIM   44.2002  A. ANTOCI and S. BORGHESI (lvi): Working Too Much in a Polluted World: A North-South Evolutionary 
Model 
    ETA   45.2002  P. G. FREDRIKSSON, Johan A. LIST and Daniel MILLIMET (lvi): Chasing the Smokestack: Strategic 
Policymaking with Multiple Instruments 
   ETA  46.2002  Z. YU  (lvi):  A Theory of Strategic Vertical  DFI and the Missing  Pollution-Haven Effect 
   SUST  47.2002  Y. H. FARZIN: Can an Exhaustible Resource Economy  Be Sustainable? 
   SUST  48.2002  Y. H. FARZIN: Sustainability and  Hamiltonian Value 
   KNOW  49.2002  C. PIGA and M. VIVARELLI: Cooperation in R&D and Sample Selection 
   Coalition 
   Theory 
   Network 
50.2002  M. SERTEL and A. SLINKO (liv): Ranking Committees,  Words or Multisets 
   Coalition 
   Theory 
   Network 
51.2002  Sergio CURRARINI (liv): Stable Organizations with Externalities 
   ETA  52.2002  Robert N. STAVINS: Experience with Market-Based Policy Instruments 
   ETA  53.2002  C.C. JAEGER, M. LEIMBACH, C. CARRARO, K. HASSELMANN, J.C. HOURCADE, A. KEELER and  
R. KLEIN (liii): Integrated Assessment Modeling: Modules for Cooperation 
   CLIM  54.2002  Scott BARRETT (liii): Towards a Better Climate Treaty 
   ETA  55.2002  Richard G. NEWELL and Robert N. STAVINS:  Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-
Based Policies 
   SUST  56.2002  Paolo ROSATO and Edi DEFRANCESCO: Individual Travel Cost Method and Flow Fixed Costs   
   SUST  57.2002  Vladimir KOTOV and Elena NIKITINA (lvii): Reorganisation of Environmental Policy in Russia: The Decade of 
Success and Failures in Implementation of Perspective Quests 
   SUST  58.2002  Vladimir KOTOV (lvii): Policy in Transition: New Framework for Russia’s Climate Policy 
   SUST  59.2002  Fanny MISSFELDT and Arturo VILLAVICENCO (lvii): How Can Economies in Transition Pursue Emissions 
Trading or Joint Implementation? 
   VOL  60.2002  Giovanni DI BARTOLOMEO, Jacob ENGWERDA, Joseph PLASMANS and Bas VAN AARLE: Staying Together 
or Breaking Apart: Policy-Makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary 
Union  
   ETA  61.2002  Robert N. STAVINS, Alexander F.WAGNER and Gernot WAGNER: Interpreting Sustainability in Economic 
Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity 
   PRIV  62.2002  Carlo CAPUANO: Demand Growth, Entry and Collusion Sustainability 
   PRIV  63.2002  Federico MUNARI and Raffaele ORIANI: Privatization and R&D Performance: An Empirical Analysis Based on 
Tobin’s Q 
   PRIV  64.2002  Federico MUNARI and Maurizio SOBRERO: The Effects of Privatization on R&D Investments and Patent 
Productivity 
   SUST  65.2002  Orley ASHENFELTER and Michael GREENSTONE: Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the Value of a 
Statistical Life 
   ETA  66.2002  Paolo SURICO:  US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences 
   PRIV  67.2002  Rinaldo BRAU and Massimo FLORIO: Privatisations as Price Reforms: Evaluating Consumers’ Welfare 
Changes in the U.K. 
   CLIM  68.2002  Barbara K. BUCHNER and Roberto ROSON: Conflicting Perspectives in Trade and Environmental Negotiations
   CLIM  69.2002  Philippe QUIRION: Complying with the Kyoto Protocol under Uncertainty:  Taxes or Tradable  Permits? 
   SUST  70.2002  Anna ALBERINI, Patrizia RIGANTI  and Alberto LONGO: Can People Value the Aesthetic and Use Services of 
Urban Sites? Evidence from a Survey of Belfast Residents 
   SUST  71.2002  Marco PERCOCO:  Discounting Environmental Effects in Project Appraisal    NRM  72.2002  Philippe BONTEMS and Pascal FAVARD: Input Use and Capacity Constraint under Uncertainty: The Case of 
Irrigation 
   PRIV  73.2002  Mohammed OMRAN: The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises and Newly Privatized Firms: Empirical 
Evidence from Egypt 
   PRIV  74.2002  Mike BURKART, Fausto PANUNZI and Andrei SHLEIFER: Family Firms 
   PRIV  75.2002  Emmanuelle AURIOL, Pierre M. PICARD:  Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Government Budget 
Constraint  
   PRIV  76.2002  Nichole M. CASTATER:  Privatization as a Means to Societal Transformation: An Empirical Study of 
Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
   PRIV  77.2002  Christoph LÜLSFESMANN: Benevolent Government, Managerial Incentives, and the Virtues of Privatization 
   PRIV  78.2002  Kate BISHOP, Igor FILATOTCHEV and Tomasz MICKIEWICZ: Endogenous Ownership Structure: Factors 
Affecting the Post-Privatisation Equity in Largest Hungarian Firms   
   PRIV  79.2002  Theodora WELCH and Rick MOLZ: How Does Trade Sale Privatization Work? 
Evidence from the Fixed-Line Telecommunications Sector in Developing Economies 
   PRIV  80.2002  Alberto R. PETRUCCI: Government Debt, Agent Heterogeneity and Wealth Displacement in a Small Open 
Economy 
   CLIM  81.2002  Timothy SWANSON and Robin MASON (lvi): The Impact of International Environmental Agreements: The Case 
of the Montreal Protocol 
   PRIV  82.2002  George R.G. CLARKE and Lixin Colin XU: Privatization, Competition and Corruption: How Characteristics of 
Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribe Payments to Utilities 
   PRIV  83.2002  Massimo FLORIO and Katiuscia MANZONI: The Abnormal Returns of UK Privatisations: From Underpricing 
to Outperformance 
   NRM  84.2002  Nelson LOURENÇO, Carlos RUSSO MACHADO, Maria do ROSÁRIO JORGE and Luís RODRIGUES: An 
Integrated Approach to Understand Territory Dynamics. The Coastal Alentejo (Portugal)  
   CLIM  85.2002  Peter ZAPFEL and Matti VAINIO (lv): Pathways to European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading History and 
Misconceptions 
   CLIM  86.2002  Pierre COURTOIS: Influence Processes in Climate Change Negotiations: Modelling the Rounds 
   ETA  87.2002  Vito FRAGNELLI and Maria Erminia MARINA (lviii): Environmental Pollution Risk and Insurance 
   ETA  88.2002  Laurent FRANCKX (lviii): Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring 
   ETA  89.2002  Timo GOESCHL and Timothy M. SWANSON (lviii): Lost Horizons. The noncooperative management of an 
evolutionary biological system. 
   ETA  90.2002  Hans KEIDING (lviii): Environmental Effects of Consumption: An Approach Using DEA and Cost Sharing 
   ETA  91.2002  Wietze LISE (lviii): A Game Model of People’s Participation in Forest Management in Northern India  
   CLIM  92.2002  Jens HORBACH: Structural Change and Environmental Kuznets Curves 
   ETA  93.2002  Martin P. GROSSKOPF: Towards a More Appropriate Method for Determining the Optimal Scale of Production 
Units 
   VOL  94.2002  Scott BARRETT and Robert STAVINS: Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change 
Agreements 
   CLIM  95.2002  Banu BAYRAMOGLU LISE and Wietze LISE: Climate Change, Environmental NGOs and Public Awareness in 
the Netherlands: Perceptions and Reality  
   CLIM  96.2002  Matthieu GLACHANT: The Political Economy of Emission Tax Design in Environmental Policy 
   KNOW  97.2002  Kenn ARIGA and Giorgio BRUNELLO: Are the More Educated Receiving More Training? Evidence from 
Thailand 
   ETA  98.2002  Gianfranco FORTE and Matteo MANERA: Forecasting Volatility in European Stock Markets with Non-linear 
GARCH Models 
   ETA  99.2002  Geoffrey HEAL: Bundling Biodiversity 
   ETA  100.2002  Geoffrey HEAL, Brian WALKER, Simon LEVIN, Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA, Gretchen DAILY, Paul 
EHRLICH, Karl-Goran MALER, Nils KAUTSKY, Jane LUBCHENCO, Steve SCHNEIDER and David 
STARRETT:  Genetic Diversity and Interdependent Crop Choices in Agriculture 
   ETA  101.2002  Geoffrey HEAL: Biodiversity and Globalization 
   VOL  102.2002  Andreas LANGE: Heterogeneous International Agreements – If per capita emission levels matter 
   ETA  103.2002  Pierre-André JOUVET and Walid OUESLATI: Tax Reform and Public Spending Trade-offs in an Endogenous 
Growth Model with Environmental Externality 
   ETA  104.2002  Anna BOTTASSO and Alessandro SEMBENELLI: Does Ownership Affect Firms’ Efficiency? Panel Data 
Evidence on Italy 
   PRIV  105.2002  Bernardo BORTOLOTTI, Frank DE JONG, Giovanna NICODANO and Ibolya SCHINDELE: Privatization and 
Stock Market Liquidity  
   ETA  106.2002  Haruo IMAI and Mayumi HORIE (lviii): Pre-Negotiation for an International Emission Reduction Game 
   PRIV  107.2002  Sudeshna GHOSH BANERJEE and Michael C. MUNGER: Move to Markets? An Empirical Analysis of 
Privatisation in Developing Countries 
   PRIV  108.2002  Guillaume GIRMENS and Michel GUILLARD: Privatization and Investment: Crowding-Out Effect vs Financial 
Diversification 
   PRIV  109.2002  Alberto CHONG and Florencio LÓPEZ-DE-SILANES: Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring Around the 
World 
   PRIV  110.2002  Nandini GUPTA: Partial Privatization and Firm Performance 
   PRIV  111.2002  François DEGEORGE, Dirk JENTER, Alberto MOEL and Peter TUFANO: Selling Company Shares to 
Reluctant Employees: France Telecom’s Experience    PRIV  112.2002  Isaac OTCHERE: Intra-Industry Effects of Privatization Announcements: Evidence from Developed and 
Developing Countries 
   PRIV  113.2002  Yannis KATSOULAKOS and Elissavet LIKOYANNI: Fiscal and Other Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization 
   PRIV  114.2002  Guillaume GIRMENS: Privatization, International Asset Trade and Financial Markets 
   PRIV  115.2002  D. Teja FLOTHO: A Note on Consumption Correlations and European Financial Integration 
   PRIV  116.2002  Ibolya SCHINDELE and Enrico C. PEROTTI: Pricing Initial Public Offerings in Premature Capital Markets: 
The Case of Hungary 
   PRIV  1.2003  Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical 
Issues 
   PRIV  2.2003  Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review 
   PRIV  3.2003  Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity 
Market 
   CLIM  4.2003  Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of 
Government Commitment 
   KNOW  5.2003  Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition 
   ETA  6.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model 
   SIEV  7.2003  Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The 
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: 
Evidence from Surveys of Developers 
   NRM  8.2003  Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse? 
   CLIM  9.2003  A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game 
with Asymmetric Information 
   KNOW  10.2003  Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy  
   CLIM  11.2003  Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of 
Climate Change Policy Analysis 
   KNOW  12.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural 
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art 
   KNOW  13.2003  Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lvix): Bio-Ecological 
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures  
   KNOW  14.2003  Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lvix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and 
Future Trajectories 
   KNOW  15.2003  Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lvix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic 
and Female Roles in Urban Economic Life  
   KNOW  16.2003  Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lvix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from 
Slovakia 
   KNOW  17.2003  Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lvix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community 




19.2003  Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities 
PRIV 20.2003  Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lvx): Monopoly with Resale 
PRIV 21.2003  Claudio MEZZETTI (lvx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation 
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 
PRIV 22.2003  Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lvx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions  
PRIV 23.2003  David ETTINGER (lvx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies 
PRIV 24.2003  Hannu VARTIAINEN (lvx): Auction Design without Commitment 
PRIV 25.2003  Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lvx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in 
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions 
PRIV 26.2003  Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lvx): Rationing in IPOs 
PRIV 27.2003  Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lvx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 
PRIV 28.2003  Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lvx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of 
Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts 
PRIV 29.2003  TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lvx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment  
PRIV 30.2003  Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lvx): Auctions with Financial Externalities 
    
(l) This paper was presented at the Workshop “Growth, Environmental Policies and Sustainability” 
organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, June 1, 2001  
 
(li) This paper was presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource 
Economics on “Property Rights, Institutions and Management of Environmental and Natural 
Resources”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, IDEI and INRA and sponsored by MATE, 
Toulouse, May 3-4, 2001  
 
(lii) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Economic Valuation of 
Environmental Goods”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in cooperation with CORILA, 
Venice, May 11, 2001 
 
(liii) This paper was circulated at the International Conference on “Climate Policy – Do We Need a 
New Approach?”, jointly organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Stanford University and 
Venice International University, Isola di San Servolo, Venice, September 6-8, 2001  
 
(liv) This paper was presented at the Seventh Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by 
the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  and the CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Venice, Italy, 
January 11-12, 2002 
 
(lv) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of the Concerted Action on Tradable Emission 
Permits (CATEP) organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice, Italy, December 3-4, 2001 
 
(lvi) This paper was presented at the ESF EURESCO Conference on Environmental Policy in a 
Global Economy “The International Dimension of Environmental Policy”, organised with the 
collaboration of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei , Acquafredda di Maratea, October 6-11, 2001  
 
(lvii) This paper was presented at the First Workshop of “CFEWE – Carbon Flows between Eastern 
and Western Europe”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Zentrum fur Europaische 
Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Milan, July 5-6, 2001  
 
(lviii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Game Practice and the Environment”, jointly 
organised by Università del Piemonte Orientale and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Alessandria, 
April 12-13, 2002 
 
(lvix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 
16-17, 2002   
 
(lvx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory, 
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002 
 







































CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
 
VOL  Voluntary and International Agreements (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
SUST  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation  
(Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
 
KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Dino Pinelli) 
 
MGMT  Corporate Sustainable Management (Editor: Andrea Marsanich) 
 
PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
 








CLIM  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
 
GG  Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation  
(Editor: Anna Alberini) 
 
NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
 
KNOW  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
 
IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
 
CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
 
PRIV  Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
 
ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
 
CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 